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Violent terrorist groups, youth gangs and organized hooligan groups pose a challenge
to democratic societies. Terrorist groups generally aim to achieve a revolution, like
the paramilitary organization of the German Nazi party before Adolf Hitler￿ s rise to
power, or RAF and the Red Brigades who aimed to overthrow the Capitalist soci-
ety. Youth gangs combat competing youth gangs in pursuit of territory, potentially
for drug-trading activities. For some supporter clubs associated primarily with foot-
ball, the aim is to ￿ght other supporter clubs. While these groups di⁄er in their
motivations and in who they target, they share three important features. First of
all, they have leaders who want to achieve certain goals. Second, in all three types
of organizations, leaders need violence from members to achieve their aims. Third,
membership consists mostly of relatively young males, who may accept to be violent
in order to establish a sense of identity by belonging to such groups.
To combat organized violent groups, it is important to understand how policing
a⁄ects their internal structure. In this paper we study how di⁄erent types of sanctions
against those engaging in violence a⁄ect membership in violent groups, and aggre-
gate violence. Policing can either be highly dependent on violence committed, or
less targeted. Less targeted measures hit members of targeted groups at equal force
independently of how violent they are. Good examples of this are the use of teargas
or water canons, or jailing potentially violent individuals over night indiscriminately,
or Israel closing borders for all Palestinians following a terrorist attack. We show
that the latter type of policing may in fact increase, rather than reduce, violence. To
the best of our knowledge, this topic has received little attention in the economics
literature.1
Even though our analysis can be applied also to terrorist organizations and youth
gangs, we present our model below focusing on supporter clubs of football hooligans
because we have well-documented evidence in this ￿eld.2 The supporter clubs we
1Earlier work includes Levitt (2004) who argues that the magnitude of policing, rather than
the type, a⁄ects violence, and Frey (2004) who argues that anti-terrorist deterrence policies may
back￿re.
2The fact that leaders view violence as a consumption good in supporter clubs and as an in-
strument for other means in terrorist groups and drug-selling gangs is consistent with our model.
For example, in terrorist organizations we could view the privately more costly form of violence as
willingness to engage in suicide bombing, and personally less costly level of violence as a willingness
2study have at least four common features. First, many individuals join supporter
clubs to bene￿t from identity and the social network o⁄ered in these clubs, rather
than to ￿ght, but they may have to be violent to join (see e.g. the work by the
psychologists Marsh 1978, Marsh and HarrØ 1978 and sociologists Dunning et al.
2002).3 Second, there are members and leaders in the clubs. Third, the leaders tend
to be more violent than the members. Kerr (1994 p. 90) writes ￿In almost every
book or extensive piece that has been written about soccer hooliganism, considerable
attention is given to the ringleaders of soccer hooligan violence￿ .4 Fourth, the clubs
are well-organized and the leaders are good at planning and organizing hooligan
episodes (Kerr 1994).5
To re￿ ect the empirical evidence of the club structure and the importance of
identity, respect, protection and network bene￿ts we set up a model where the leaders
require members to ￿ght in order to stay in the club. Members di⁄er in their valuation
of various membership bene￿ts, which is their private knowledge. From now on,
we label these bene￿ts for the sake of simplicity as identity. The fact that leaders
are powerful is re￿ ected in that they can require younger members to ￿ght and
exclude them if they do not. Exiting the club is costly because the identity will be
lost. However, members who value identity more can always mimic those with lower
valuation. As a consequence, leaders face a trade-o⁄. They can go for a small group
with a high level of violence per member, or a larger group with less violence per
member.
Variable costs of violence reduce in equal proportions the level of violence that
leaders can extract from all members. As a result, they increase the price of violence
to participate in nightly raids or become a sniper. Similarly, only some members of the drug-selling
gang may be willing to kill, while others could still be useful for leaders by selling drugs or beating
at command.
3Dunning et al (2002, p. 21) writes ￿In these gangs, ability and willingness to use violence and
to ￿ght tend to become criteria for membership of and prestige within the group - for the status of
these males in their own and each others￿eyes as ￿ men￿ .￿
4Marsh (1978), for example, categorized hooligans into several di⁄erent groups, including ￿aggro
leaders￿and ￿￿ghters￿. Robins (1984, p. 58) gives a painting quote by a sixteen-year old member
of a ￿ghting crew discussing a leader. ￿He￿ s the top man of all the crews, I reckon. He￿ s the best
￿ghter. He￿ s mad, goes around with a shooter or a cut-throat. Any time there￿ s a ￿ght he has to
steam in ￿rst. He used to have to ￿ght with the top man of the other End.￿
5To quote the head of the British National Football Intelligence Unit, ￿I think there is organiza-
tion and ringleaders. Spontaneous hooliganism occurs a lot less than planned hooliganism￿ (Kerr
1994, p. 94).
3in terms of membership. This relative price e⁄ect encourages leaders to reduce the
level of violence they require in order to expand membership. Increasing the ￿xed
costs of violence aggravates the mimicking e⁄ect, as it reduces relatively more the
amount of violence that can be required from the type valuing identity less. Even if
the leaders before the change in policy opted for a low level of violence to keep all
members in the club, they may now turn focus to a high level of violence without the
members willing to ￿ght less. Therefore, a harsher governmental policy may ￿nally
increase violence.
Previous literature on law and economics, like seminal contributions by Becker
(1968) and Becker and Landes (1974), has concluded that increasing the costs of
crime tends to reduce crime. We ￿nd that this need not be the case with violent
groups. The key explanation for this marked di⁄erence is that membership in violent
groups is endogenous. Increasing ￿xed costs of violence causes a relatively larger drop
in the amount of violence that leaders can require from members valuing membership
less. It may then be optimal for leaders to forgo bene￿ts from their membership, and
move to a smaller and more violent group.
Our ￿ndings do not imply that using ￿xed cost of violence would always be
suboptimal. As long as membership does not change, increasing either ￿xed cost or
variable cost both push towards less violence. A utilitarian government may want
to use ￿xed costs as part of the crime-￿ghting package, for example if these are
cheaper to implement. However, our ￿ndings suggest a need to study supporter
clubs carefully especially before implementing increases in ￿xed costs of violence,
due to the potential backlash.
Our paper is related to several strands of economic literature. Violent supporter
clubs remind of criminal gangs in that they are violent, that they serve as a platform
for social interaction, and because society may aim to abolish them, or at least to
reduce their activity. In contrast to criminal organizations in the economics literature
on organized crime (see e.g. Shelling 1984, Konrad and Skaperdas 1997 and Levitt
and Venkatesh 2000), we do not focus on illegal economic activity but rather on
identity and violence.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduce identity to economic modeling and study
how it a⁄ects economic outcomes. We analyze how it a⁄ects violence and the society￿ s
possibilities to reduce violence. Glaeser (2005) examines a model of the supply of hate-
creating stories by politicians, and the willingness of voters to believe in such stories.
4The two approaches are complementary: redistribution that Glaeser highlights as a
motive for group-level hatred is in most cases absent between the supporter clubs, or
youth gangs, that we study. However, in civil wars the two mechanisms may interact.
Glaeser (2005) suggests how group-level hatred arises, in Europe most recently in the
civil wars of ex-Yugoslavia. Our model of prestige and identity helps to identify why
individual citizens may become part of groups committing atrocities: even in absence
of material gains, they view this as a means of gaining identity as promised by their
ruthless leaders.
Even though violence associated with supporter clubs has not received any atten-
tion in the economics literature, there is a vast literature in other social sciences such
as sociology, psychology and ethnography (see e.g. Dunning et al. 1984, Dunning et
al. 2002, and Kerr 1994). Interestingly, sociologists and psychologists have for long
been arguing also that more policing might lead to more violence in supporter clubs
(see e.g. Cohen 1971, Taylor 1971, Buford 1991 and Kerr 1994). While they have
focused on how police o¢ cers stimulate hooligans to ￿ght more, we identify that the
reason is due to group dynamics arising from optimizing leaders.
2 Empirical Evidence on Supporter Clubs
From chariot races in the Roman Empire to contemporary football, team sports have
been plagued by violent supporter clubs. Already in 532, in Constantinople, team
support at the ￿Hippodrome￿escalated from insults to mob riots, which ￿nally lay
the town in ruins. Much later, in 1314, football was banned in London for the fear of
tumult and disorder surrounding the games (Armstrong 1998). Another, more recent
example, is from 1909 when 54 police constables were injured when 6000 spectators
were involved in a riot in Glasgow (Carnibella et al. 1996).
Throughout the last century supporter violence was a large problem, yet it esca-
lated during the 1980s. Most notoriously, the violence initiated by English football
hooligans in Heysel stadium in Belgium in 1985 resulted in chaos and death of 39
persons. Even though there was a downward trend during the 1990s, many societies
are still plagued by organized supporter violence (Carnibella et al. 1996). For exam-
ple, Argentina is currently experiencing extreme levels of supporter violence where
stabbings and shootings are prevalent (Dunning et al. 2002).
There is plenty of evidence showing that search for identity is an important mo-
tivation to join supporter clubs. Marsh spent three years with English football sup-
5porters in the end of the 1970s and found that being a football hooligan enabled
young males to achieve a sense of identity through recognition of their peers. The
supporter clubs ￿lled the function of providing an alternative career for these indi-
viduals with little prospects of success in school or work (see Marsh 1978 and Marsh
and HarrØ 1978). Members are also willing to invest a lot in building their identity.
The following quote is from a recent book written by a leading individual in one of
Sweden￿ s most notorious supporter clubs, earlier called Black Army. ￿Black Army
was surrounded by myth and being part of it implied a necessity for others to pay at-
tention and watch out for you. That was how we considered ourselves, that was how
media framed it, and that was how the public saw it. It was the perfect ground for a
little bastard who longed for respect and considered violence to be a condition to get
it￿(H￿glund, 2005, p. 35; own translation). Furthermore, supporter clubs have es-
tablished their own dress code, relying on expensive high-end brands like ￿Burberry￿
and ￿Stone Island￿ .6
To reduce hooligan violence, governments have traditionally used intense polic-
ing. In the 1970s and 1980s harsh, often indiscriminate, policing was common. Large
police forces were typically surrounding the supporter groups outside the stadiums.
While in Italy the police still tends to use harsh and indiscriminate policing, some-
times being armed with for example water canons and automatic weapons, the Eng-
lish police has changed strategy in favor of more discriminative policing (Carnibella
et al. 1996). This includes both the use of technical devices such as surveillance
cameras, and of special trained intelligence personnel, for example the so called spot-
ters who have the responsibility of identifying and monitoring hooligans (see e.g.
Carnibella et al. 1996, www.Footballnetwork.org, Preventing Football Hooliganism).
Other countries have followed England towards more discriminative policing. In
Denmark, the police changed strategy in the mid-1990s in favor of less armed police
6We note that there is evidence that also members of gangs have a strong preference for a social
identity. Levitt and Venkantesh (2000) show that low-level gang members who sell drugs often get
an extremely low income from it. This, they argue, shows that members have other incentives to
belong. ￿Certainly, economics considerations play an important role in the decisions of members
and the activities of the gang. However, we ￿nd that social/nonpecuniary factors are likely to play
an important role as well￿(Levitt and Venkantesh, 2000, p. 758). In addition, Padilla (1992) studies
in detail a Chicago gang in which members must endure three types of violence. They ￿rst get a
beating when entering, then when breaking internal rules, and ￿nally when exiting the gang. Padilla
suggests that the reason for accepting this harsh treatment and being a gang member, apart from
the potential economics bene￿ts, which were often small, was to get a social identity and respect.
6using special police cars to come close to the violent hooligans in order to be able to
speci￿cally target them. The Swedish police is currently adopting a similar system
(Dagens Nyheter, April 12, 2005). Such policy change ￿nds support from several
psychologists and sociologists who have concluded that indiscriminate policing can
increase violence. Psychologists Stott and Adang advised the Dutch police in their
preparations for the European Soccer Championship in 2004. Stott states ￿Indis-
criminate, heavy-handed policing can create rather than reduce con￿ ict￿ . According
to Adang ￿Police interventions must occur before events get out of hand but must be
targeted only at those fans who are actually misbehaving￿(Adang and Stott, 2004).
3 Supporter Clubs
3.1 Game Structure
A supporter club consists of leaders and members. Leaders derive utility from ￿ghting
by members and the total number of members. Members derive utility from belonging
to a supporter club, while they dislike ￿ghting. The latter assumption is without loss
of generality: our results could be generalized to a case in which some members like
￿ghting, as long as there are also at least two types of members who do not. Members
di⁄er in the utility they derive from membership. There are two types of members,
1 and 2. We denote variables referring to type j, j 2 f1;2g by subscript j.7 The
number of potential members of type j is nj, and the number of members of type j
who stay and are not expelled is mj, giving as total membership m = m1 +m2. The
number of leaders is normalized to unity. Leaders di⁄er in their valuation of violence.
At the ￿rst stage, leaders declare a minimum level of violence b v required from
members. At the second stage, members decide how much to ￿ght. After observing
the level of ￿ghting by individual members, leaders decide whether to keep them or
expel them.
Leaders cannot distinguish an individual member￿ s private valuation of identity.
This is a reasonable assumption, as members who value identity highly have an
incentive to lie about their type. Leaders therefore must ask for one level of violence
only.
Violence of amount v generates cost ￿v+￿ for those committing it. ￿ is a marginal
cost parameter capturing injuries caused by hooligans or the police, being jailed
overnight or added into a criminal register, carefully meted out judicial punishments
7Our results would generalize into more than 2 discrete groups.
7and psychological costs from violence. ￿ is an additional ￿xed cost arising from
police activity and criminal sanctions for those who belong to supporter clubs and
commit violence. It re￿ ects the possibility that any supporter engaging in violence,
independently of the level of violence committed, has a probability of incurring the
costs mentioned above. For example, using tear gas to disperse a violent crowd hurts
those targeted, independently of how much violence they have committed. Formally,
cost ￿ is levied on those whose v > 0. We therefore introduce an indicator variable
D, so that D = 0 if v = 0 and D = 1 if v > 0. All our results would remain the same
in case ￿ and ￿ would be expected costs from committing violence, and members
would be risk-neutral.
Members of type j receive bene￿ts ￿j from identity, so that ￿2 > ￿1. Total utility
for a member of type j who chooses a level of violence vj and is not expelled is
uj = ￿j ￿ ￿vj ￿ ￿D; (1)
while the utility of the expelled members is zero.
Aggregate level of violence is
V = m1v1 + m2v2: (2)
Leaders di⁄er in their relative valuation of violence. Leaders of type i receive utility
ul = ￿m + ￿iV . (3)
By ￿ > 0;￿i > 0, leaders receive a positive utility from the aggregate level of
violence by their club, and from the number of members who stay. One reason why
leaders have a reason to care about the number of members, even if members do not,
is that leaders are evaluated according to how many followers they have. We call the
utility that leaders derive from the number of followers prestige. For the same reason,
leaders care also about the aggregate level of violence. The assumption that leaders
di⁄er only in their valuation of violence is without loss of generality, and su¢ ces to
account for di⁄erent levels of violence and membership in di⁄erent supporter clubs.
Leaders may expel those who ￿ght less than they require, in which case the
expelled lose identity and receive payo⁄ of zero. Leaders announce a minimum level
of violence required, b v, and then expel the members who do not ful￿ll it. Expulsion
following defection is necessary to maintain credibility. Violence is supplied and
identity is received as a ￿ ow. For both types of members, the participation constraint





needs to be satis￿ed for type j to stay.
3.2 Equilibria
Leaders face two alternative strategies. One is to choose such level of violence that
both types 1 and 2 stay, and another to choose such a level that only type 2 stays. In
the ￿rst case, leaders choose b v = (￿1 ￿￿)=￿ ￿ v, and in the latter, b v = (￿2 ￿￿)=￿ ￿
v. It is never optimal to choose any other level of b v. To see this, note that if
b v < (￿1 ￿ ￿)=￿, or (￿1 ￿ ￿)=￿ < b v < (￿2 ￿ ￿)=￿, then leaders can increase the
required violence without causing members to leave. If b v > (￿2 ￿ ￿)=￿, then all
members would leave, resulting in zero utility for leader. With b v = v, the utility of
leaders of type i is
ul = ￿(n1 + n2) + ￿i(n1 + n2)v: (4)
With b v = v, the utility of leaders of type i is
ul = ￿n2 + ￿in2v: (5)
The optimal strategies by the leaders are given by
Proposition 1 Leaders of type i prefer to choose the required level of violence b v = v




[n2 (￿2 ￿ ￿1) ￿ n1(￿1 ￿ ￿)]: (6)
Otherwise, leaders choose the minimum level of violence b v = v.
Proof. Follows by inserting v =
(￿1￿￿)
￿ into (4) and v =
(￿2￿￿)
￿ into (5) and then
simplifying the condition that ul given by (4) is higher.
According to Proposition 1, leaders choose the level of violence that just keeps
members of type 2 and leads to an exit by members of type 1 if this increases aggregate
violence, and if the leaders value this increase more than the utility they would derive
from type 1 members if they would stay. If n2 (￿2 ￿ ￿1)￿n1(￿1￿￿) < 0, then leaders
always choose b v = v, independently of their valuation of violence. In other words,
choosing b v = v would be a dominated strategy if the di⁄erence ￿2 ￿￿1 is su¢ ciently
small, or if n2 is very small. This is intuitive: Type 2 members must be willing to
9engage in a considerably higher level of violence than type 1 members for leaders to
be willing to forgo prestige and violence they can extract from type 1 members, in
exchange to force type 2 members to move from b v = v to b v = v.
The leaders￿choice between a smaller and more violent group with v =
(￿2￿￿)
￿ and
a wider and less violent group with v =
(￿1￿￿)
￿ depends on their relative valuation
between the number of members and violence committed by them. (6) allows to
solve a condition for a group with leaders of type i to remain more inclusive and less
violent. If and only if n2
n1 (￿2 ￿ ￿1) ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿) > 0 and
￿i ￿ e ￿i =
￿￿
n2
n1 (￿2 ￿ ￿1) ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿)
, (7)
then leaders select a smaller and more violent group.
We can now prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The threshold valuation of violence e ￿ above which leaders choose
smaller and more violent groups is increasing in n1, ￿1; ￿ and ￿ and decreasing in
n2, ￿2, and ￿.
Proof. Follows by di⁄erentiating (7).
Proposition 2 reports a surprising ￿nding: Increasing the ￿xed cost of violence
may encourage leaders to switch to smaller and more violent groups, while increasing
the variable cost of violence has an opposite e⁄ect.
In other words, as type 2 members can mimic type 1 members, increasing the ￿xed
cost of violence renders keeping type 1 members relatively more expensive, in terms of
forgone violence. Increasing the variable cost of violence, on the other hand, reduces
violence that leaders can command from the two types by the same proportion. It
increases the price of violence relative to membership, thus encouraging some leaders
to shift to less violent and larger groups.8
4 Policy Implications
We will now study policy implications that follow from this analysis. We ￿rst study
how policing a⁄ects violence and then how it a⁄ects welfare.
4.1 Policing and Violence
Law and order, in the form of police activity to capture perpetrators of violence
and justice system to punish them, increase the cost of violence for all members,
8This is true whenever the leaders do not always select v.
10independently of their valuation of identity. If the membership base stays unchanged,
then this lowers violence. This result is in line with Becker (1968) and Becker and
Landes (1974). In an equilibrium with both type 1 and type 2 members staying,
the participation constraint of type 1 members is binding. Correspondingly, the
participation constraint of type 2 members is binding in case only they stay. When
membership base does not change, violence declines smoothly in both ￿xed and
variable costs of violence.
However, these straightforward comparative statics are only part of the potential
e⁄ects. A change in policing might encourage leaders to change from one equilibrium
membership base to another, as the ￿xed cost of violence enters the conditions in
Proposition 1. When accounting for the endogenous membership, the e⁄ects of pun-
ishment on the level of violence may become non-monotonic, and a marginal increase
in the ￿xed cost of violence may result in a discrete upward jump in the aggregate
violence.
In particular, to study which equilibrium is more violent, we note that total
violence is given by




if a large group is selected and












then the larger group is more violent.
We summarize our ￿ndings as three propositions:
Proposition 3 An increase in the variable cost of violence ￿ or in the ￿xed cost of
violence ￿ results in a decrease in the aggregate violence, provided that membership
does not change.
Proof. Follows by di⁄erentiating (8) and (9) with respect to ￿ and ￿.
Proposition 4 A marginal increase in the variable cost of violence ￿ may result in
a downward jump in aggregate violence, associated with an increase in membership.
11Proof. Proposition 1 gives us a condition for the leaders to choose a smaller and
more violent group. Note that a necessary condition for small groups not being a
dominated strategy is n2
n1 (￿2 ￿ ￿1)￿(￿1￿￿) > 0. Assume next that this is the case,
as otherwise there cannot be any jump. By (6), @e ￿i=@￿ > 0. This implies that an
increase in ￿ causes leaders with some values of ￿ to switch to larger and less violent
groups.
Proposition 5 A marginal increase in the ￿xed cost of violence ￿ may result in an
upward jump in aggregate violence, associated with a decrease in membership.
Proof. As in Proposition 4, a necessary condition for small groups not being a
dominated strategy is n2
n1 (￿2 ￿ ￿1) ￿ (￿1 ￿ ￿) > 0. Assume next that this is the
case, as otherwise there cannot be any jump. By (6), @e ￿i=@￿ < 0. This implies that
an increase in ￿ causes leaders with some values of ￿ to switch to smaller and more
violent groups.
Propositions 3 to 5 have empirically testable implications. Proposition 3 implies
that if increased policing is not associated with change in the size of supporter clubs,
then total violence should decrease. Proposition 4 implies that if a small increase
in the variable cost of violence, either in the form of policing or tougher sentences,
would lead into a large drop in aggregate violence, then this should be accompanied
by an increased size of violent supporter clubs. Conversely, proposition 5 suggests
that should a small increase in the ￿xed cost of violence lead into an increase in
aggregate violence, then this should be accompanied by a decreased size of violent
supporter clubs.
4.2 Optimal Policing
Importantly, Propositions 4 and 5 imply that the welfare e⁄ects of policing and
sentencing can be non-monotonic. To evaluate socially optimal policing, assume that
the social welfare function is utilitarian. Assume that the marginal external cost of
violence is ￿, ￿ > 0, and assume that the cost of implementing the ￿xed cost ￿ of
violence is C(￿), so that C(0) = 0, and C(￿ + ￿) > C(￿) 8￿ ￿ 0;￿ > 0. Assume
also that the cost of implementing the variable cost ￿ of violence is D(￿), so that
D(0) = 0, and D(￿ + ￿) > D(￿) 8￿ ￿ 0;￿ > 0. These assumptions imply that the
marginal cost of increasing either ￿xed or variable punishment for violence is strictly
positive. The cost functions need not be continuous, allowing some threshold levels,
for example it could be that implementing any punishment for violence results already
12in some ￿xed implementation cost. Social welfare function can now be written as
SWF = n1u1 + n2u2 + ul ￿ ￿V ￿ C(￿) ￿ D(￿): (10)
The ￿rst term gives the utility of type 1 potential members. The second term
is the utility of type 2 members, and the third term is the utility of leaders. The
fourth term is the external social cost of violence, while the ￿fth and the sixth terms
are the costs of punishing for violence. The socially optimal punishment strategy
is such a pair of ￿ and ￿ which maximizes (10). While it is not possible to give
explicit solutions for this without specifying functional forms of the costs, our analysis
allows identifying a possibility for Pareto improvements, even without establishing
any additional assumptions:
Proposition 6 A marginal decrease in the ￿xed cost of violence results in a Pareto-
improvement, provided that it results in larger supporter clubs.
Proof. By Proposition 5, reducing ￿ reduces V if it results in larger supporter clubs.
Note that u1 = 0 with both large and small supporter clubs, and thus the utility of
type 1 potential members does not change. With large supporter clubs, u2 > 0 while
with small clubs, u2 = 0. Therefore, a marginal decrease in ￿ would improve the
welfare of type 2 members, provided that it results in larger supporter clubs. Also
ul is increased, which follows from revealed preferences: After the reduction in the
￿xed cost of violence, leaders could still have kept the same group size, and increased
the required level of violence. If they, instead, preferred to switch to a larger and less
violent club, then this must have further increased their utility. When aggregate
violence is reduced, so are the external costs. Finally, reducing the ￿xed cost of
violence also reduces the cost of law and order to implement it.
An increase in the ￿xed or variable cost of violence can never generate a Pareto-
improvement. This is because it unambiguously reduces the utility of leaders. How-
ever, punishments for violence can still be justi￿ed from utilitarian perspective, pro-
vided that the costs of punishment are not prohibitively high, and that the external
social cost of violence, measured by ￿, is su¢ ciently high.
Our welfare results suggest the paramount importance of understanding the group
dynamics of violent supporter clubs, before deciding on policy interventions. A well-
meaning intervention may, at worst, be counterproductive. This is especially the case
when increasing the ￿xed cost of violence as this may back￿re.
135 Conclusion
In this paper, we study how di⁄erent sanctions against violence can be expected to
a⁄ect membership in violent groups, as well as total violence committed. We compare
targeted measures that increase variable costs of violence, and cruder measures which
levy a ￿xed cost on violence, like teargas or punishing any participation in a ￿ght. We
analyze the e⁄ects of the costs of violence when violent groups are highly hierarchical,
with leaders deciding how much violence they require from members in order to allow
them to stay. We take as our starting point that members di⁄er in their valuation of
membership.
First of all, we ￿nd that increasing either ￿xed or variable cost of violence reduces
total violence committed, as long as it does not change total membership in supporter
clubs. We ￿nd an intriguing asymmetry in how aggregate violence reacts to sanctions
when membership changes. A small increase in the variable cost of violence may
encourage violent leaders to move away from small and highly violent group to a
larger and less violent one. Leaders would then reduce the level of violence required
su¢ ciently to attract also those potential members who previously stayed outside
due to the high cost of ￿ghting. A small increase in the ￿xed cost of violence, on the
other hand, may trigger a counterproductive response, encouraging leaders to move
from a larger and less violent group towards a smaller and more violent one. Then
aggregate violence would increase.
Our results have policy implications in combating terrorist groups, extremist
groups not yet engaging in terrorism, violent street gangs, and hooligan groups plagu-
ing especially football. When addressing the challenge posed by such groups, societies
should carefully analyze the dynamics in order to avoid well-meaning but counter-
productive policy responses.
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